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1.  Introduction 
A currency crisis may be defined as a speculative attack on the foreign exchange value of 
a currency that either results in a sharp depreciation or forces the authorities to defend the 
currency by selling foreign exchange reserves or raising domestic interest rates. For an economy 
with a fixed exchange rate regime, a currency crisis usually refers to a situation in which the 
economy is under pressure to give up the prevailing exchange rate peg or regime. In a successful 
attack the currency depreciates, while an unsuccessful attack may leave the exchange rate 
unchanged, but at the cost of spent foreign exchange reserves or a higher domestic interest rate. 
A speculative attack often leads to a sharp exchange rate depreciation despite a strong policy 
response to defend the currency value.   
  Currency crises have always been a feature of the international monetary system, both 
during the Bretton Woods system of generalized fixed parities among major industrialized 
countries in the post-World War II period as well as after its breakdown in the early 1970s. 
Dramatic episodes of currency crises include the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system  in 
1971-73, the crisis of the British pound in 1976, the near-breakdown of the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism in 1992-93, the Latin American Tequila Crisis following Mexico’s peso 
devaluation in 1994-95, the financial  crisis that swept through Asia in 1997-98 and, more 
recently, the global financial crisis in 2008-09 that forced sharp depreciations in many advanced 
as well as developing economies (see IMF, 2008 and IMF, 2009a).    
 
2.  Causes of Currency Crises 
2.1. Currency Crisis Models 
Currency crises have been the subject of an extensive economic literature, both 
theoretical and empirical.  Theoretical models of currency crises are often categorized as first-, 
second-, or third-generation, though many models combine elements of more than one generic 
form.  
The first generation models of, for example, Krugman (1979) focus on inconsistencies 
between domestic macroeconomic policies, such as an exchange rate commitment and a 
persistent government budget deficit that eventually must be monetized. The deficit implies that 
the government must either deplete assets, such as foreign reserves, or borrow to finance the 3 
 
imbalance. However, it is infeasible for the government to deplete reserves or borrow 
indefinitely.  Therefore, without fiscal reforms, the government must eventually finance the 
deficit by creating money. Since excess money creation leads to inflation, it is inconsistent with 
keeping the exchange rate fixed and first-generation models therefore predict that the regime 
inevitably must collapse.  
In second generation models of currency crises, best represented by Obstfeld (1986, 
1994), policymakers weigh the cost and benefits of defending the currency and are willing to 
give up an exchange rate target if the costs of doing so exceed the benefits.  In these models 
doubts about whether the government is willing to maintain its exchange rate target can lead to 
the existence of multiple equilibria, and a speculative currency attack can take place and succeed 
even though current policy is not inconsistent with the exchange rate commitment. This is 
because the policies implemented to defend a particular exchange rate level, such as raising 
domestic interest rates, may also raise the costs of defense by dampening economic activity 
and/or raising bank funding costs. The private sector understands the dilemma facing the 
government, and may question the commitment to fixed exchange rate when other 
macroeconomic objectives are compromised. In this framework, a speculative attack is more 
likely to succeed if higher interest rates exacerbating already weak domestic employment or 
banking sector conditions. Consequently, the timing of the attack—and whether it will occur-- 
cannot be determined, as it is no longer unique.  
These different explanations for currency crises are not mutually exclusive. The 
fundamental imbalances stressed by first-generation models make a country vulnerable to shifts 
in investor sentiment, but once a crisis does occur, the second-generation models help explain its 
self-reinforcing features. 
Third-generation models are harder to characterize simply but generally focus on how 
distortions in financial markets and banking systems can lead to currency crises. Different third-
generation models offer various mechanisms through which these distortions may lead to a 
currency crisis. Some models stress how distortions may emerge in the form of credit constraints. 
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2001), for example, highlight that an initial depreciation of a 
currency raises the cost of foreign-currency debt obligations of firms and lowers profits, which in 
turn may limit borrowing capacity when credit is constrained. The subsequent fall in investment 4 
 
and output associated with these borrowing limitations may lower the demand for domestic 
currency and trigger a currency crisis.  
Other third-generation models highlight how financial liberalization and government 
guarantees of private sector liabilities can generate moral hazard and unsustainable fiscal deficits 
that can lead to crises. For example, McKinnon and Pill (1995) suggest that financial 
liberalization combined with deposit insurance may induce banks to fuel a lending boom 
involving both foreign and domestic credit expansion that eventually leads to a banking and 
currency crisis. Chang and Velasco (2002) emphasize the possibility of self-fulfilling 
international liquidity crises in an open economy with unrestricted capital markets in which 
banks issue deposits in domestic and foreign assets, but have longer term illiquid investments 
that cannot be readily converted to cash in event of a bank run.  Dooley (2000) and Burnside, 
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2004) argue that implicit or explicit government guarantees to the 
banking system may give banks an incentive to take on foreign debt, making the banking system 
vulnerable to attack.  The fragile banking sector in turn makes the task of defending the peg by 
hiking domestic interest rates more difficult and may lead to the eventual collapse of the 
domestic currency. 
 
2.2. Impossible Trinity 
The ability of countries to maintain commitments to particular exchange rate targets 
became increasingly more difficult with increasing global financial integration and capital 
mobility over time. According to the principle of the impossible trinity (sometimes referred to as 
the holy trinity or trilemma) in international economics, when capital is freely mobile, a country 
cannot simultaneously have (i) a fixed or managed exchange rate, and (ii) an independent 
domestic monetary policy, i.e., control of domestic interest rates. 
  When capital mobility is high and a country pegs its exchange rate to another country’s 
currency, its domestic interest rates will be linked to foreign interest rates, which severely limits 
its ability to pursue an independent domestic monetary policy. For example, a tightening of 
domestic monetary policy that raises domestic rates above foreign rates also induces capital 
inflows in response to the cross-border return differential. This dampens the initial rise in 
domestic interest rates; it also induces lower domestic demand for imported goods, which further 
dampens the contractionary effects of a higher interest rate. 5 
 
  The constraint imposed by the unholy trinity was put to the test most dramatically by the 
three major currency crises of the 1990s—the speculative attack on the European Monetary 
System (EMS) in 1992-93, the Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95, and the Asia crisis of 1997-98.  
As Germany raised its interest rates to fight inflation following reunification in the early 
1990s, other European countries who had linked their currencies to the Deutschemark through 
the EMS—found matching the higher German interest rates onerous for their economies. In 1992 
the system was overwhelmed by large speculative flows of capital, and consequently some 
countries dropped out of the EMS and let their currencies depreciate in order to allow their 
domestic interest rates to diverge from those in Germany.     
  In the case of Mexico, policymakers faced capital flight following upward U.S. interest 
rate movements and Mexican political developments in 1994.  Efforts by Mexico’s central bank 
to avoid raising domestic interest rates while also limiting depreciation of the peso proved 
unsustainable and contributed to the peso crisis in December 1994.  
  The origins of the Asia crisis of 1997-98 were in part related to the fact that many 
countries had effectively linked their currencies to the dollar at a time when the dollar 
appreciated relative to the Japanese yen and Chinese renminbi.  With the Thai baht, Indonesia 
rupiah, and other Asian currencies rising relative to the yen and the renminbi, the products of 
Thailand, Indonesia, and other Asian countries grew more expensive relative to those of Japan 
and China.  The decline in competitiveness put pressure on their currencies to depreciate. Other 
important factors also were at work in the Asian crisis, including elements of bank depositor 
panic and fragile banking systems, attributable to the lack of incentives for effective risk 
management created by implicit or explicit government guarantees against failure.   
  These examples illustrate how emerging markets as well as industrial countries often 
have not been able to make credible commitments to fixed exchange rates for an extended 
period.
 Although it is technically feasible for a country to maintain a pegged exchange rate as 
long as its central bank has access to enough foreign exchange reserves to respond to speculative 
attacks, its central bank also must be willing always to subordinate all the other goals of 
monetary policy.  In practice, this means that it must be willing to raise domestic interest rates 
high enough to maintain the attractiveness of its currency to speculators.   
But, as the examples above show, many countries with pegged exchange rate regimes at 
some time or another have found forgoing an independent monetary policy to be a price too high 6 
 
to pay, particularly when high domestic rates adversely affect domestic unemployment or 
financial sector stability.  In other words, countries with pegged or fixed exchange rate regimes 
are often not prepared to abandon completely the use of monetary policy for stabilization 
purposes. With their priorities in doubt, they are more likely to become lightning rods for 
speculative attack and currency crises. 
In principle, countries with floating exchange rates should be more resistant to currency 
crises, since one would expect continuous market adjustment to limit the buildup of pressures 
leading to extreme currency overvaluation and subsequent large discrete currency declines as 
may occur under fixed exchange rate regimes. In fact, pegged and intermediate exchange rate 
regimes –those that maintain relatively rigid exchange rates but do not formally peg to a single 
anchor currency -- are associated with greater susceptibility to currency crises --  as well as other 
financial crises, such as debt crises, sudden stops in capital inflows, and  banking crises. This has 
been particularly true  for developing and emerging market countries with more open capital 
accounts (Ghosh, Ostry, and Tsangarides, 2010).  Nonetheless, many countries purportedly with 
floating exchange rates have experienced currency crises. This may be attributable to the fact 
that countries reporting their currencies as on a floating rate regime are often quite reluctant in 
fact to allow their currencies to float due to so-called fear of floating behavior (Calvo and 
Reinhart, 2002)—and de facto follow a pegged exchange rate regime.   
 
3.  Association with other Crises 
Currency crises are often associated with other types of financial crises, such as banking 
crises. The occurrence of so-called twin crises may be attributable to a number of channels of 
causation: a bank crisis leading to a currency crisis, a currency crisis leading to a bank crisis, or 
joint causality.  
A bank run can cause a currency attack if the increased liquidity associated with a 
government bailout of the troubled banks erodes their ability to maintain the prevailing exchange 
rate commitment (Velasco, 1987; Calvo, 1997).  Or, as discussed above, a weak banking sector 
may precipitate a currency crisis if speculators anticipate that policymakers would prefer to give 
up exchange rate stability in order to avoid bankruptcies and further strains on the banking sector 
rather than endure the costs of defending the domestic currency (Obstfeld, 1994).  7 
 
A possible reverse chain of causality, from currency crises to the onset of banking crises, 
is also well recognized. If banks hold significant holdings of unhedged foreign liabilities, a 
currency crisis shock can adversely alter the banking sector directly by causing a deterioration of 
bank balance sheets as currency depreciation raises the domestic currency burden of these 
liabilities.  
The joint occurrence of currency and banking may also reflect a response to common 
factors. Banks and firms are exposed to liquidity shocks if they finance long-term lending and 
investment with short-term borrowing (Chang and Velasco, 2001). Consequently, an 
international liquidity crunch may trigger twin crises.  The global financial crisis of 2007-08 had 
similar effects on currency values and banking sector health in many countries.  Although started 
by losses associated with sub-prime mortgage derivative products (e.g. asset-back securities and 
credit default swaps) in the U.S. and Western Europe, it quickly led to a world-wide 
deleveraging process where institutions moved to limit their foreign currency exposure. A flight 
to the U.S. dollar—the  global reserve and payments currency—ensued, forcing very large 
currency devaluations in many advanced and developing countries (see IMF, 2008 and IMF, 
2009a).
 
Currency crises may be associated with other types of financial crises, such as sudden 
stops of foreign capital inflows, sharp rises in capital outflows, and sovereign debt defaults. 
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2002), for example, provide a sudden-stop interpretation for the 
2001-02 financial crisis in Argentina in which international investors  lost faith in the country’s 
ability to finance its growing fiscal indebtedness while also maintainig a currency peg to the 
dollar at a time that the economy was in the midst of a three year- recession. The resulting capital 
flow reversal prompted a bank run, which in turn forced the end of its currency peg and a sharp  
currency depreciation. The depreciation significantly worsened the government’s already weak 
fiscal position and led Argentina to default on its public debt.  
 
4.  Incidence of Currency Crises 
4.1. Crisis Definitions and Measurement Issues 
Different definitions of currency crisis have been used in the empirical literature. Some 
papers use a narrow definition of crisis, i.e. a successful attack that results in a significant 
depreciation of the exchange rate. For example, Frankel and Rose (1996) define a currency crisis 8 
 
as a nominal depreciation of 25 percent or greater, which is at least 10 percent greater than the 
depreciation in the preceding year.  To avoid capturing the large exchange rate fluctuations 
associated with high inflation periods, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998) use a definition that 
requires, in addition to a 25 percent depreciation, at least a doubling in the rate of depreciation 
with respect to the previous year and a rate of depreciation the previous year below 40 percent. 
To restrict the sample to episodes in which the exchange rate was relatively stable the previous 
year, another definition they employ requires a 15 percent minimum rate of depreciation, a 
minimum 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation with respect to the previous year, and a 
rate of depreciation of below 10 percentage points in the previous year.   
Other papers use a broader definition that includes episodes of unsuccessful attacks as 
captured by large changes in an index of exchange market pressure, defined as a weighted 
average of exchange rate changes and reserve losses.
1 Following convention (see, for example, 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1995; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), the weights attached to 
the exchange rate and reservation components of the currency pressure index are inversely 
related to the variance of changes of each component over the sample for each country.  The 
intuition is that if there is an attack on the currency, either the exchange rate would depreciate or 
the central bank would sell foreign currency to support the exchange rate.   
Changes in the index above some threshold are deemed to represent crises, defined as a 
zero-one binary variable, i.e. 1 for crisis and 0 for no crisis. The threshold is usually defined in 
terms of country-specific moments. For example, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) use a 
one and a half standard deviation threshold, Glick and Hutchison (2000, 2005, 2006) use a 2 
standard deviation threshold, while Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Kaminsky, Lizondo, and 
Reinhart (1998) use a three standard deviation cutoff.
2  
To minimize the chances of capturing the continuation of the same currency crisis 
episode, it is common to impose windows on the data. That is, after identifying each large 
change in currency pressure, any large changes in the following fixed-period (e.g. two years) are 
                                                            
1 Most currency pressure measures of crises for emerging economies do not include episodes of defense involving 
sharp rises in interest rates because of limited data for market-determined interest rates in many countries.  
2 Some studies use a hybrid condition. For example, Glick and Hutchison (2000, 2005, 2006) define large changes in 
exchange rate pressure as changes in their pressure index that exceed the mean plus two times the country-specific 
standard deviation, provided that it also exceeds five percent. The first condition ensures that any large depreciation 
is counted as a currency crisis, whereas the second condition attempts to screen out changes that are insufficiently 
large in an economic sense relative to the country-specific monthly change of the exchange rate. 
 9 
 
treated as part of the same currency episode and skipped before continuing the identification of 
new crises. 
 
4.2. Frequency of Currency Crises  
Figure 1 shows the incidence of currency crises in the post-Bretton Woods period, 1975-
2007 using data from Laeven and Valencia (2008). They define a currency crisis as a nominal 
depreciation of the currency of at least 30 percent that is also at least a 10 percent increase in the 
rate of depreciation compared to the year before.  For countries that meet the criteria for several 
continuous years, they use the first year of each 5-year window to identify the crisis. This 
methodology identifies 201 currency crises over the period. 
The figure indicates that currency crises are a common phenomenon, averaging more 
than five per year since 1975, with relative peaks in the early 1980s at the time of widespread 
sovereign debt defaults, the early 1990s at the time of the EMS and Tequila crises, and in 1998 at 
the time of the Asian financial crisis and the Russian debt default..
3 The 3-year period, 2005-07 
appears to be a period of relative tranquility. However, the global financial crisis in 2008-09 
caused widespread financial market turmoil. As shown in Table 1, twenty-three countries 
experienced exchange rate depreciations of 25 percent or more during the 9-month period 
between August 2008 and February 2009, many of which would satisfy the formal definition of 
currency crisis used above. 
The association between currency crises and banking crises is illustrated in Figure 2, 
which shows the incidence of twin crises by year. Observe that twin crises are much less 
frequent than currency crises alone. While 1994 experienced 25 currency crises world-wide, only 
9 of these episodes coincided with a banking crisis. The 1990s was the peak period of twin 
crises, abstracting from the 2008-09 global financial crisis for which complete data on banking 
crises are not yet available.  
  Table 2 compares the association of currency crises and the cessation of net capital 
inflows, using results from a study by Hutchison and Noy (2006) of sudden stops in 24 emerging 
market economies over the period 1975-2002.  It shows that currency crises coincide with 
sudden stops roughly half of the time. Of the 60 currency crises identified in emerging markets 
                                                            
3 The figure for 1994 is inflated by the devaluation of the 14 African members of the CFA zone against the French 
franc and the dollar.  10 
 
during this period, 34 coincided with a sudden stop and 26 did not. On the other hand, there are 
many more instances of sudden stops that do not coincide with currency crises.  Of the 119 
sudden stops, 85 did not coincide with a currency crisis..  
 
5.  Predicting  Currency Crises 
The high costs of currency crises in terms of real output losses have prompted efforts to 
predict them.  International financial institutions and central banks have sought to develop so-
called early warning systems (EWS) of currency crises for the purpose of improving monitoring 
of financial conditions.  Many private investment banks also have developed such models to 
enhance foreign exchange trading strategies. Berg et al. (2000), Goldstein et al. (2000), (IMF , 
2002a ). Edison (2003), and Berg, Borensztein, and Pattillo (2005) provide good surveys of the 
early warning literature on currency crises.  
The design of currency crisis warning systems requires several elements: (i) a crisis 
definition, discussed in the previous section, (ii) a set of possible explanatory variables, and (iii) 
a statistical methodology to generate warnings of crises. 
 
5.1. Determinants 
The theoretical and empirical literature has identified a vast array of variables potentially 
associated with currency crises (see, e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1996; Kaminsky et al., 1998; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). These variables include macroeconomic and financial 
fundamentals such as, money or domestic credit growth, the fiscal deficit, current account 
deficit, real exchange rate overvaluation, and output growth; as well as variables that gauge a 
country’s vulnerability to attacks, such as measures of the adequacy of international reserves 
relative to possible short-run liabilities of foreign and domestic origin, foreign financing needs, 
and the overall soundness of the financial sector. Other possible variables include indicators of 
market expectations or investors’ risk appetite, such as interest rate differentials, and exposure to 
contagion from crises in other countries. Trade and financial openness may also affect the 
likelihood of currency crisis.   
The intuition for the association of these variables with currency crises is straightforward. 
The simple monetary model of exchange rate determination, for example, predicts that money 
growth in excess of the anchor currency’s money growth will cause higher inflation that creates 11 
 
pressure for depreciation of the home currency. If the home country successively resists 
depreciation for a time, the ultimate fall in the exchange rate may occur as a large discrete 
movement in the form of a currency crisis.  A rise in credit growth similarly may imply possible 
inflationary pressures as well as a rise in the short-term domestic currency liabilities of the 
banking system. Greater short-term foreign debt implies a greater burden on the economy in the 
event of a sudden stop of foreign lending.   
Higher foreign reserve holdings imply greater ability to respond to speculative 
depreciation attacks. The ratio of M2 to reserves captures to what extent the liabilities of the 
banking system are backed by international reserves. In the event of a currency crisis, bank 
depositors may rush to convert their domestic currency assets into foreign currency, so that this 
ratio captures the ability of the central bank to meet those demands and stabilize the currency. 
The ratio of external debt to foreign reserves measures exposure to the risk that investors chose 
not to roll over debt to either sovereign or private domestic borrowers.  
 Relatively large exchange rate overvaluation is expected to be associated with an 
increased likelihood of a currency crisis because of the negative effects on competitiveness. 
Adverse performance of the terms of trade because of relatively higher import prices erodes 
purchasing power and dampens domestic economic activity.  Declining real GDP growth may 
signal worsening economic conditions and undermine investor confidence in home country 
investment opportunities. 
 
5.2. Statistical Methodology 
  After a set of useful indicators has been identified, the information contained in the 
indicators needs to be combined in an objective manner. Three common approaches are event 
studies (e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), the signaling method (e.g., Kaminsky, Lizondo, 
and Reinhart, 1998), and the limited dependent variable probit/logit model (e.g., Frankel and 
Rose, 1996).  
 
Event Study Approach 
The event studies approach examines the behavior of individual indicators in the period 
leading up to crises. For each variable, behavior during pre-crisis periods is compared with 
behavior during tranquil or non-crisis periods.  Figure 3 illustrates the behavior of selected 12 
 
variables around the time of currency crises, using results from Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) 
based on data for 20 emerging market countries over the period 1970 to1995.  
The top left hand panel of Figure 3 shows that, on average, the 12-month growth in the 
domestic credit/GDP ratio is higher than in tranquil times. Growth in domestic credit/GDP 
remains above normal as the currency crisis nears, consistent with a credit boom. The top right 
hand panel shows the evolution of the 12-month change in M2/reserves of central banks; this 
ratio also grows well above its norm prior to crises. The increases are associated with a sharp 
decline in foreign currency reserves, as authorities seek to stabilize the exchange rate. During the 
year before currency crises, the real exchange rate shows evidence of being overvalued, 
appreciating relative to its trend in comparison to tranquil periods. The real exchange-rate 
appreciation reverses itself rapidly with the devaluation. Crises in the sample are preceded, on 
average, by a deterioration of the terms of trade. The deterioration of the terms of trade and the 
overvaluation of the currency are reflected in a marked slowing in economic activity and a 
decline in output prior to crises. 
 
Signaling Approach 
Similarly to the event study approach, the indicator approach also involves monitoring 
key variables for signs of unusual behavior that signal a future crisis.  However, the latter 
approach involves specifying a particular numeric threshold, beyond which the variable sends a 
signal of a future crisis. For example, if the country-specific threshold for the ratio of the current 
account deficit to GDP is 3 percent, a ratio above 3 percent would imply a greater probability of 
a crisis.  When a warning signal is issued, there are two possibilities: (i) a crisis occurs, implying 
the signal given was accurate, or (ii) a crisis does not occur, implying the signal given was a false 
alarm. When a warning signal is not issued, there are also two possibilities: (i) a crisis occurs, 
implying the absence of a warning signal was false, or (ii) a crisis does not occur and the signal 
was correct. 
The determination of the optimal threshold level involves striking a balance between 
failing to predict a crisis that actually occurs (a Type I error) and predicting a crisis that does not 
actually occur (a Type II error). On the one hand, if the threshold is set too lax, then the indicator 
will catch all crises, but will give lots of false signals (noise). On the other hand, if the threshold 13 
 
is too tight, the indicator will never issue a false signal, but it will miss all the crises. Hence, for 
each variable, the optimal threshold is selected so as to maximize the good signal –to-noise ratio.  
The choice of which indicators to focus relatively more attention depends on the loss 
function of the policymaker and/or analyst. One criterion is to rank the usefulness of indicators in 
the declining order of their signal-to-noise ratios.  Thus, for example, an indicator that displays 
four times as many good signals as false signals (noise) would be regarded as better than an 
indicator with a ratio of only two good signals for every false one. Alternatively, if one is 
concerned less about false alarms and more about failing to predict a crisis, one may focus on 
indicators that correctly predict a high fraction of actual crises. Thus an indicator that predicts 
correctly 50 percent of actual crises would be regarded as more useful than one that predicts 
correctly only 25 percent of crises.
4 
Figure 4 reports a representative application of the signaling approach from Edison 
(2003). Edison considers 19 different indicator variables, analyzed at a monthly frequency, 
ranking the indicators based on the signal-to-noise criterion.  These results are computed for her 
sample of 28 countries, over the horizon January 1970 to April 1995. (The sample period is 
truncated in April 1995 to provide a large enough number of observations to evaluate the 
predictive capabilities of the model for the 1997-99 crises.) Observe in her analysis that the real 
exchange rate, measured as the deviation from its trend, is ranked as the top performer; its signal-
to-noise ratio is about 4:1.  The next best performer is the 12-month percent change in the ratio 
of short-term debt to reserves, with a 2.5:1 ratio, followed by the M2/reserves ratio. 
The signaling approach in its most basic applications does have some shortcomings. First, 
by evaluating each variable separately, it does not consider how an interrelated set of conditions 
could make an economy more vulnerable to crisis. In response, some studies aggregate the 
information from different variables into a single prediction by calculating a composite 
probability as the weighted sum of the number of indicators that are signaling, where each 
indicator is weighted by its reliability in predicting crises. A second shortcoming of the signaling 
                                                            
4 Because of differences in the way these two criteria treat false versus missed signals, they may not give the same 
ranking, i.e. indicators may be ranked as top performers based on one criterion, but be ranked poorly based on the 
other.  The difference arises because, although both criteria positively value correctly predicted crises, the signal-to-
noise ratio criterion penalizes an indicator for giving false alarms. That is, the more false signals an indicator issues, 
the lower is its signal-to-noise ratio.  In contrast, the share-of-crises-predicted correctly criterion penalizes missed 
signals, i.e., the failure to give an alarm when a crisis subsequently occurs, but does not penalize for false signals, 
i.e., alarms that are issued prior to a crisis that actually occurs. 
 14 
 
approach is that it ignores possible correlations between different indicators. Third, it issues only 
binary signals, i.e., either an indicator is above its threshold, indicating a signal, or it is below its 
threshold, indicating no signal about a possible crisis. Consequently, there is no measure of the 
strength of the signal possibly related to the extent it exceeds its threshold. 
 
Probit and Other Approaches 
The probit/logit approach addresses some of the shortcomings of the signaling approach. 
It estimates a probability relationship where the dependent variable is a discrete measure of crisis 
(e.g., 1 or 0, if a crisis occurs or does not occur, respectively) by regressing on a set of 
explanatory variables. A probit regression generates predictions taking into account the 
correlation among all the predictive variables, and allows testing of the statistical significance of 
individual variables.  It can also show the probability of a future crisis. However, because the 
probit is a nonlinear model, the contribution of a particular variable depends on the magnitude of 
all the other variables. This means that the relationship between changes in the variables 
themselves and changes in their contribution to the crisis prediction is not always transparent.  
More recent studies have developed new strategies in an attempt to improve predictive 
performance (see the references in Berg et al, 2005). These include piecewise-linear 
generalization in a probit model and refining the crisis variable from a binary to a trinary variable 
-- crisis periods, post-crisis recovery periods, tranquil periods. Other studies explore more 
sophisticated econometric techniques, such as autoregressive conditional hazard models and 
regime switching with time-varying probabilities. Some studies depart from a regression-based 
setting altogether and use classification rules to identify safety zones for fundamentals under 
which currency crashes are unlikely to occur,  or a  binary recursive tree technique to explore 
possible interactions among time-varying economic determinants and structural variables, such 
as financial, corporate, and public sector governance, that may not change much over time.  
 
5.3. Assessment of Crisis Prediction Approaches 
The variables identified as useful have varied somewhat from study to study, owing to 
differences in crisis definitions, data sets, and methodologies. Berg and Patillo (1999) and Berg, 
Andrew, Eduardo Borensztein, and Catherine Patillo (2005) provide comparative evaluations of 
the accuracy of different methods.  15 
 
Several studies (IMF, 2002a; Berg, Borensztein, and Pattillo, 2005) conclude that market 
views, or analysts’ views, as expressed in bond spreads, credit ratings, and exchange rate 
expectation measures have been unreliable predictors of currency crises, particularly in the 
1990s. However, some indicators, such as real exchange rate overvaluation, reserve adequacy 
(relative to short-term debt or broad money), domestic credit growth, current account, export 
growth, and reserves growth have tended to perform well in some studies.  
Berg, Borensztein, and Pattillo (2005) evaluate the performance of signal and probit 
models, with particular emphasis on the importance of out-of-sample forecasting in model 
evaluation, as well as the trade-off between missing crises and generating false alarms. They find 
that over the Asia crisis period, the best early warning system (EWS) models did dramatically 
better than non-model-based predictors, such as spreads, ratings, and assessments of informed 
analysts. Over a more recent period that included the Argentine and Turkish crises in 2001, the 
performance of some of these alternative predictors improved somewhat, so that the relative 
superiority of the models declined. This suggests that recent crises were not the surprises that the 
Asia crises were, either because they were easier to predict or because analysts’ sensitivity was 
improved. 
Overall, the consensus is that EWS models have some value in providing early warning 
about which individual countries are most vulnerable to crisis. However, they generate a lot of 
false alarms, i.e. even if an EWS gives a signal, a crisis may not occur. In addition, they are less 
successful at predicting the timing of crises. 
 
5.4. Globalization, Capital Controls, and Currency Crises 
Trade openness is another determinant that is generally accepted to play a role in the 
determination of currency crises.  Several studies find that greater trade integration reduces a 
country’s financial fragility and the likelihood of a currency crisis by increasing both the ability 
and willingness to service external obligations (IMF, 2002b). A greater export ratio decreases the 
likelihood of sharp reversals of capital flows, as the country is more able to service its foreign 
currency– denominated debt. In addition, trade openness serves as an incentive to meet external 
obligations by making a country more vulnerable to creditors’ sanctions in case of default. 
Hence, higher trade integration tends to reduce the frequency of external financial crises.  This is 16 
 
supported by Figure 5, which shows that currency crises over the period 1975-1999 were more 
frequent in countries that are less integrated into the global trading system.  
Findings about the role of capital openness on currency crises are more mixed. This is an 
important issue in light of the dramatic rise in global financial integration, particularly among the 
advanced and emerging market economies, over the past three decades. As shown in Figure 6,  
financial integration, measured as the sum of a country’s external assets and liabilities relative to 
GDP, has risen more than sixfold  since 1970 (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). Increased 
financial integration in turn has sparked a broad and vigorous discussion among academics and 
policymakers on the risk to currency stability. Recent work on the 2008-09 financial crisis 
suggests that emerging markets with greater total external liabilities relative to the size of the 
economy experienced greater exchange rate depreciations and losses of reserves. 
This raises the issue of the desirability and feasibility of limiting the volume and 
composition of capital inflows and outflows and, in particular, the effectiveness of imposing 
legal restrictions on cross-border financial transactions, one of the few tools at the disposal of 
policymakers to influence capital flows, i.e. capital controls. The sharp rise in financial 
integration has gone hand in hand with a dramatic decrease in countries’ de jure restrictions on 
capital flows, although almost no economy has completely eliminated capital controls, and in 
many cases they remain substantial, with officials frequently increasing the intensity of controls 
during episodes of financial disruption. However, despite the frequent use of capital controls as a 
policy tool, there is no general consensus on critical questions regarding their efficacy. Existing 
research on the effects of capital controls on capital flows is relatively sparse and the results 
often ambiguous; while a number of individual country studies exist, there is relatively little 
cross-country research on this topic. Glick and Hutchison (2005) and Glick et al. (2006) focus on 
the effect of capital controls on exchange rate stability and currency crises. They find no 
evidence that capital controls have been effective in insulating countries from currency crises, 
even when taking into account the likelihood that countries with relative weak economic 
fundamentals and financial systems are more likely to impose capital controls (and hence present 





6.  Effects of Currency Crises 
There are several ways in which a currency crisis may affect economic activity.  On the 
one hand, a depreciation of the domestic currency that occurs in a successful currency attack, 
may expand the tradable goods sector and spur growth by correcting an overvalued currency or 
by making the exchange rate more competitive. On the other hand, a depreciation may be 
contractionary by increasing the repayment costs of external debts denominated in foreign 
currencies, particularly in dollars. In addition, sudden stops or the reversal of capital inflows 
during a crisis can slow down growth by lowering investment activity, while a rise in the 
external debt burden from devaluation in the presence of liability dollarization can lower 
investment activity and growth. 
Until the currency crashes of the 1990s, the mainstream view had been that any negative 
effects from a currency depreciation were ultimately offset by the positive effect of stimulus to 
net exports, leading to an the overall expansionary effect of a depreciation on  output.  However, 
recent literature emphasizes the contractionary effects of depreciations, particularly in 
developing countries. Gupta, Mishra, and Sahay (2003), for example, analyze the behavior of 
output for a sample of 195 currency crisis episodes in developing countries during 1970-98. 
They find that more than three-fifths of the crises in the sample were contractionary, and that 
output contraction was more likely greater in large and more developing economies than in small 
and less developing economies, and crises in countries preceded by large capital inflows were 
more likely to be associated with contraction during crises.  Hutchison and Noy (2005, 2006) 
investigate the output effects of currency and banking crises in emerging markets during 1975-97  
and find that currency crises are very costly, reducing output by about 5 to–8 percent over a 2 to4 
year period. They also show that currency crises accompanied by sudden stops have especially 
severe economic consequences, as the abrupt reversal in foreign credit inflows in conjunction 
with a realignment of the exchange rate typically cause a sharp drop in domestic investment, 
domestic production, and employment. 
An analysis of currency (and banking) crises by the IMF (2009b) calculates the output 
losses over time associated with currency  crises in emerging markets from the early 1970s to 
2002. Figure 7, reports the average decline in output relative to trend following currency crises 
(the analysis also reports the effects of banking crises) and indicates that the medium-term output 
losses following crises are substantial. On average, output falls steadily below its pre-crisis trend 18 
 
until the second or third year after the crisis and does not fully recover to its pre-crisis trend. 
Thus currency crises can have adverse long-term effects. However, countries that are more open 
to trade are likely to experience less dramatic drops in real growth and much quicker rebounds in 
the aftermath of a currency crisis (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998; Gupta, Deepak, and Sahay, 
2000; IMF, 2002b). For example, rapid export growth helped bring Asian economies out of 






































Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.   Currency Depreciation against U.S. Dollar, August 2008 – February 2009 






















Country %  Depreciation 
Zambia  60.0 
Hungary  58.1 
Russia  52.3 
Brazil  51.6 
Korea  51.6 
Romania  50.0 
Sweden  49.5 
Mexico  48.4 
Australia  46.2 
Turkey  45.7 
Czech Republic  45.0 
New Zealand  44.8 
Iceland  42.4 
United Kingdom  40.0 
Swaziland  37.1 
South Africa  37.1 
Norway  36.8 
Indonesia  31.4 
Mauritius  28.8 
Paraguay  27.7 
Uzbekistan  25.9 
Ghana  25.2 
Kazakhstan  25.0 20 
 
Table 2.  Currency Crises and Sudden Stops 
  Currency Crisis  No Crisis 
A. Normal Crises and Sudden Stops 
Sudden Stop   34 (6%)  85 (16%) 
No Sudden Stop  26 (5%)  389 (73%) 
B. Major Crises and Major Sudden Stops 
  Currency Crisis  No Crisis 
Major Sudden Stop   26 (5%)  49 (9%) 
No Major Sudden Stop  23 (4%)  436 (82%) 
 
Note: The table reports the number of currency crises or instances of no 
crises in 24 emerging markets over the period 1975-2002. The figures in 
parentheses express these numbers as a percent of available country-year 
observations.   A normal (major) currency crisis is defined as the deviation 
in a currency pressure index of more than 2 (3) standard deviations from 
the country-specific mean. A (major) sudden stop is defined as a positive 
change in the current account to GDP ratio of more than 3 (5) percentage 
points.  
Source: Hutchison and Noy (2006). 21 
 













Note: Currency crisis is defined as a nominal depreciation of the currency of at least 30 percent 
that is also at least a 10 percent increase in the rate of depreciation compared to the year before. 
Five-year exclusion windows employed. The figure for 1994 is inflated by the devaluation of the 
14 African members of the CFA zone against the French franc and the dollar. 
































Note: A twin crisis is defined as currency crisis that is accompanied by a banking crisis in the 
preceding, same, or following year.  
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008).   23 
 








Note: The horizontal axes represent the number of months before (with a negative sign) and after 
a crisis. Vertical axis reports level of variables reported as 12-month changes, in percent, relative 
to “tranquil” times, except for the real exchange rate which is defined as deviations from trend, 
in percent, relative to “tranquil” times. An increase in the real exchange-rate index denotes a 
depreciation. The sample consists of 20 small open economies countries experiencing currency 
crises during the period 1970–mid-1995. Currency crises are defined as changes in a weighted 
average of the change in the nominal exchange rate and of reserves that exceed three standard 
deviations from the mean (separate sample characteristics are used for countries experiencing 
hyperinflations).  
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Notes:  Table reports the signal-to noise-ratio of indicators during 24 months prior to crisis. 
These results are computed for a sample of 28 countries, over the horizon January 1970 to April 
1995.   













Note: A currency crisis is defined as an exchange rate depreciation vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar of at 
least 25 percent and at least double the rate of depreciation in the previous year, as long as the 
latter is less than 40 percent—to exclude hyperinflationary episodes (see Milesi-Ferretti and 
Razin, 1998). Open economies are those with trade openness –exports plus imports over GDP-- 
greater than the median. 
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Note:  The figure  depicts the sum   of countries’  total equity, foreign direct investm ent 
FDI), external debt and other assets and liabilities relative to total GDP.  
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), updated through 2006. 27 
 










Output Effects of Currency Crises
 
 
Notes: Figure plots output level decline as percent of pre-crisis trend, for year t= -1, first year of 
crisis at t = 0, and subsequent years on x-axis.  90% confidence bands indicated by dashed lines. 
The sample includes countries experiencing crises in period from early 1970s to 2002. Currency 
crises are identified based on the methodology of Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998): a 15 percent 
minimum rate of nominal depreciation against the U.S. dollar, a minimum 10 percent increase in 
the rate of depreciation with respect to the previous year, and a rate of depreciation of below 10 
percentage points in the previous year. 
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